第34章

Let us go over them again, for fear of mistake, for equivocation here might be attended with dangerous results.Killing is a matter which requires to be well-timed, and to be backed with a good probable opinion.You have assured me, then, that by giving a proper turn to the intention, it is lawful, according to your fathers, for the preservation of one's honour, or even property, to accept a challenge to a duel, to give one sometimes, to kill in a private way a false accuser, and his witnesses along with him, and even the judge who has been bribed to favour them; and you have also told me that he who has got a blow may, without avenging himself, retaliate with the sword.But you have not told me, father, to what length he may go." "He can hardly mistake there," replied the father, "for he may go all the length of killing his man.This is satisfactorily proved by the learned Henriquez, and others of our fathers quoted by Escobar, as follows: 'It is perfectly right to kill a person who has given us a box on the ear, although he should run away, provided it is not done through hatred or revenge, and there is no danger of giving occasion thereby to murders of a gross kind and hurtful to society.And the reason is that it is as lawful to pursue the thief that has stolen our honour, as him that has run away with our property.For, although your honour cannot be said to be in the hands of your enemy in the same sense as your goods and chattels are in the hands of the thief, still it may be recovered in the same way- by showing proofs of greatness and authority, and thus acquiring the esteem of men.And, in point of fact, is it not certain that the man who has received a buffet on the ear is held to be under disgrace, until he has wiped off the insult with the blood of his enemy?'" I was so shocked on hearing this that it was with great difficulty I could contain myself;but, in my anxiety to hear the rest, I allowed him to proceed."Nay," he continued, "it is allowable to prevent a buffet, by killing him that meant to give it, if there be no other way to escape the insult.This opinion is quite common with our fathers.For example, Azor, one of the four-and-twenty elders, proposing the question, 'Is it lawful for a man of honour to kill another who threatens to give him a slap on the face, or strike him with a stick?' replies, 'Some say he may not; alleging that the life of our neighbour is more precious than our honour, and that it would be an act of cruelty to kill a man merely to avoid a blow.Others, however, think that it is allowable; and I certainly consider it probable, when there is no other way of warding off the insult; for, otherwise, the honour of the innocent would be constantly exposed to the malice of the insolent.'

The same opinion is given by our great Filiutius; by Father Hereau, in his Treatise on Homicide, by Hurtado de Mendoza, in his Disputations, by Becan, in his Summary; by our Fathers Flahaut and Lecourt, in those writings which the University, in their third petition, quoted at length, in order to bring them into disgrace (though in this they failed); and by Escobar.

In short, this opinion is so general that Lessius lays it down as a point which no casuist has contested; he quotes a great many that uphold, and none that deny it; and particularly Peter Navarre, who, speaking of affronts in general (and there is none more provoking than a box on the ear), declares that 'by the universal consent of the casuists, it is lawful to kill the calumniator, if there be no other way of averting the affront- ex sententia omnium, licet contumeliosum occidere, si aliter ea injuria arceri nequit.'

Do you wish any more authorities?" asked the monk.I declared I was much obliged to him; I had heard rather more than enough of them already.But, just to see how far this damnable doctrine would go, I said, "But, father, may not one be allowed to kill for something still less? Might not a person so direct his intention as lawfully to kill another for telling a lie, for example?" "He may," returned the monk; "and according to Father Baldelle, quoted by Escobar, 'you may lawfully take the life of another for saying, "You have told a lie"; if there is no other way of shutting his mouth.'

The same thing may be done in the case of slanders.Our Fathers Lessius and Hereau agree in the following sentiments: 'If you attempt to ruin my character by telling stories against me in the presence of men of honour, and I have no other way of preventing this than by putting you to death, may I be permitted to do so? According to the modern authors, I may, and that even though I have been really guilty of the crime which you divulge, provided it is a secret one, which you could not establish by legal evidence.

And I prove it thus: If you mean to rob me of my honour by giving me a box on the ear, I may prevent it by force of arms; and the same mode of defence is lawful when you would do me the same injury with the tongue.

Besides, we may lawfully obviate affronts and, therefore, slanders.In fine, honour is dearer than life; and as it is lawful to kill in defence of life, it must be so to kill in defence of honour.' There, you see, are arguments in due form; this is demonstration, sir- not mere discussion.

And, to conclude, this great man Lessius shows, in the same place, that it is lawful to kill even for a simple gesture, or a sign of contempt.