第7章

INTRODUCTION.

When wealth, considered in the general, is conceived to be a thing either so clear as to require no definition, or so simple as to be fully grasped by any definition, two different and opposing systems naturally seem to arise concerning it.

The wealth of all the individuals in a state being, it may be said, of necessity measured by the amount of the national wealth, whatever adds to the wealth of the nation must increase the stocks of individuals.But it has always been found that nations have become most wealthy when they have engaged most extensively in commerce and manufactures.To encourage commerce and manufactures by every possible means, should, therefore, be the great aim of the legislator; and every enactment and regulation of his conducing to this effect, as it cannot but tend to the increase of the general funds, must ultimately add to the stocks of individuals.This view of the matter leads directly to a system of unceasing regulation and restraint.

Again, on the other hand, it may be said, that, as the wealth of the nation is necessarily made up of the riches of the various individuals in it, so the national wealth must grow as each individual adds to the portion of it which he possesses.But every restraint is a hindrance to a man's acquiring wealth, and he always gains by evading it.As, therefore, all interference on the part of the legislator, operates as a restraint, he never in any case ought to interfere.

As the former view of the subject produces a system of general regulation and restraint, this teaches the doctrine of complete inaction on the part of the legislator, of the removal of all restraint, and of perfect freedom of trade.

Both systems proceed on the assumption of the exact identity of public and private wealth; of Wealth, as it is the same word, being always the same thing, whether applied to individuals or communities, and being in its increase and decrease subjected in all cases to similar laws; an assumption flowing easily from the conception that its nature is very simple and may without difficulty be apprehended.

The latter of these systems, that adopted by Adam Smith, we might expect would at present, be most popular in Europe.Institutions and forms very often endure after the circumstances that had originally called them forth have disappeared, and when, consequently, their operation injuriously restrains the movements of some new order of things.Such seems the condition of most European kingdoms at present.The frame of their existing constitutions and laws was moulded in remote times, in ages of comparative barbarism and stern military rule, and is, therefore, in many pans, unsuited to the circumstances of the present period.It is perceived that a multitude of abuses exist, and the efforts of the majority are directed to detect, expose, and do away with them.The prejudices of men of liberal minds and enlarged views, for even such men have prejudices, run consequently, rather towards overthrowing and rooting out, than to establishing and maintaining.A system of political economy, the fundamental principles of which, inculcated the doctrine that every attempt of the ruler to direct the industry of the community was injurious, and that all laws having this tendency, should be abrogated, fell in with the current of public opinion and could not but draw to itself a large body of zealous and able advocates.It is in this temper that Mr.Bentham addresses its author."On this subject you ride triumphant, and chastise the impertinence of kings and ministers with a tone of authority, which it required a courage like yours to venture upon, and a genius like yours to warrant a man to assume." (4)It may be remarked, also, that as the circumstances of Europe, in remote ages, produced the former system, in the present give popularity to the latter; so in North America, where a new form of government suited to the state which society has there assumed, has been established, we might expect, as is the case, that a medium would be taken between the two extremes.(5)My main object, in this book, is to show that that notion of the exact identity of the causes giving rise to individual and national wealth, on which the reasonings and arguments of Adam Smith all along depend, is erroneous, that consequently the doctrines he has engrafted on it, cannot be thus maintained, and are inconsistent with facts admitted by himself.

Chapter 1Of the Identity of Individual Interest Consideredas a Simple Principle.

I have already observed that through every part of his work, in the conduct of all his reasons and arguments, Adam Smith blends together the consideration of the processes by which the capitals of individuals and nations are increased, and always treats of them as precisely identical.

Sometimes this is assumed as a self-evident truth, sometimes it is a deduction from an ingenious theory; but, in one shape or other, it forms the basis on which his whole system is built.If this simple view of the subject be admitted as correct, it may very easily be made to lead to the conclusions at which he is desirous of arriving.