第79章

They so deceive men as to make them think that during the birth of a man the births of all other beings are suspended, so that not even a fly comes to life at the same time that he is being born, under the same region of the heavens.And if this be admitted with respect to the fly, the reasoning cannot stop there, but must ascend from flies till it lead them up to camels and elephants.Nor are they willing to attend to this, that when a day has been chosen whereon to sow a field, so many grains fall into the ground simultaneously, germinate simultaneously, spring up, come to perfection, and ripen simultaneously;and yet, of all the ears which are coeval, and, so to speak, congerminal, some are destroyed by mildew, some are devoured by the birds, and some are pulled by men.How can they say that all these had their different constellations, which they see coming to so different ends ? Will they confess that it is folly to choose days for such things, and to affirm that they do not come within the sphere of the celestial decree, whilst they subject men alone to the stars, on whom alone in the world God has bestowed free wills ? All these things being considered, we have good reason to believe that, when the astrologers give very many wonderful answers, it is to be attributed to the occult inspiration of spirits not of the best kind, whose care it is to insinuate into the minds of men, and to confirm in them, those false and noxious opinions concerning the fatal influence of the stars, and not to their marking and inspecting of horoscopes, according to some kind of art which in reality has no existence.

CHAP.8.--CONCERNING THOSE WHO CALL BY THE NAME OF FATE, NOT THE POSITIONOF THE

STARS, BUT THE CONNECTION OF CAUSES WHICH DEPENDS ON THE WILL OF GOD.

But, as to those who call by the name of fate, not the disposition of the stars as it may exist when any creature is conceived, or born, or commences its existence, but the whole connection and train of causes which makes everything become what it does become, there is no need that I should labor and strive with them in a merely verbal controversy, since they attribute the so-called order and connection of causes to the will and power of God most high, who is most rightly and most truly believed to know all things before they come to pass, and to leave nothing unordained;from whom are all powers, although the wills of all are not from Him.Now, that it is chiefly the will of God most high, whose power extends itself irresistibly through all things which they call fate, is proved by the following verses, of which, if I mistake not, Annaeus Seneca is the author:--" Father supreme, Thou ruler of the lofty heavens, Lead me where'er it is Thy pleasure; I will give A prompt obedience, making no delay, Lo ! here I am.Promptly I come to do Thy sovereign will;If thy command shall thwart my inclination, I will still Follow Thee groaning, and the work assigned, With all the suffering of a mind repugnant, Will perform, being evil; which, had I been good, I should have undertaken and performed, though hard, With virtuous cheerfulness.

The Fates do lead the man that follows willing; But the man that is unwilling, him they drag."(1)Most evidently, in this last verse, he calls that "fate" which he had before called "the will of the Father supreme," whom, he says, he is ready to obey that he may be led, being willing, not dragged, being unwilling, since "the Fates do lead the man that follows willing, but the man that is unwilling, him they drag The following Homeric lines, which Cicero translates into Latin, also favor this opinion :--"Such are the minds of men, as is the light Which Father Jove himself doth pour Illustrious o'er the fruitful earth."(1)Not that Cicero wishes that a poetical sentiment should have any weight in a question like this; for when he says that the Stoics, when asserting the power of fate, were in the habit of using these verses from Homer, he is not treating concerning the opinion of that poet, but concerning that of those philosophers, since by these verses, which they quote in connection with the controversy which they hold about fate, is most distinctly manifested what it is which they reckon fate, since they call by the name of Jupiter him whom they reckon the supreme god, from whom, they say, hangs the whole chain of fates.

CHAP.9.--CONCERNING THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD AND THE FREE WILL OF MAN, INOPPOSITION TO THE DEFINITION OF CICERO.

The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination.(2)And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events.Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him).