第24章 Letter VII(3)
What has been touched here,and in former papers,will be sufficient to show,in some measure,how King Charles was enabled to divide a nation so united and so heated as this nation was,on the discovery of the Popish Plot;to oppose so avowedly and so resolutely the exclusion of his brother,the prospect of whose succeeding to the crown was become still more dreadful,even by that small part of Coleman's correspondence,which had come to light:
and yet to attach so numerous a party to himself,nay to his brother;to lay aside Parliaments for several years,and not only to stand his ground,but to gain ground in the nation,at the same time.But there is still something more to be added.He had not only prepared for the storm,but he acquired new strength in the midst of it;that is,in the proceedings on the Popish Plot,and the bill of exclusion.He would gladly have kept the former out of Parliament;but when it was once there,he put on the appearances of great zeal for the prosecution of it.These appearances helped him to screen his brother;as the ill success of the Exclusion Bill in the House of Lords,where it was rejected by sixty-three against thirty,helped to screen himself from the violence of the House of Commons.But that which gave him the principal advantage,in the present contests,was another management.As soon as the first preparatory steps were made to the bill of exclusion in 1678,he declared himself,in a speech to his Parliament,ready to pass any bills to make his people safe in the reign of his successor,so they tended not to impeach the right of succession,nor the descent of the crown in the true line.He persisted in his declaration to the last;and if he had done nothing else,I imagine that he would have gained no great popularity.When a free people lie under any grievance,or apprehend any danger,and try to obtain their prince's consent to deliver them from one,or prevent the other,a flat refusal,on his part,reduces them to the melancholy alternative of continuing to submit to one,and to stand exposed to the other,or of freeing themselves from both,without his consent;which can hardly be done by means very consistent with his and their common interest.King Charles was too wise to push the nation to such an extremity.He refused what his Parliament pressed on him,in the manner and on the principle they pressed it;but then his refusal was followed by expedients,which varied the manner,and yet might have been managed so as to produce the effect;and which seemed to save,rather than actually saved,the principle.Numbers concurred,at that time,in avowing the principle;and the tests had made many persons think religion safe;as the King's offers made them think it no fault of his,if it was not made safer.The council had prepared some expedients;and the limitations,and other provisions against a popish successor,proposed directly from the throne by the Chancellor in 1679,went a great way towards binding the hands of such a successor,and lodging the power,taken from him,in the Parliament.
But the scheme of expedients,debated in the Oxford Parliament,was a real exclusion from every thing,but the title of a king.The first article banished the Duke of York,during his life,to the distance of five hundred miles from England,Scotland and ireland;and the tenth,to mention no more,excluded him ipso facto,if he came into any of these kingdoms;directed that he should suffer,in this case,as by the former bill;and that the sovereignty should vest forthwith in the regent,that is,in the Princess of Orange.Surely this was not to vote the lion in the lobby into the house.It would have been to vote him out of the house,and lobby both,and only suffer him to be called lion still.I am not ignorant of the refinements urged by Sir William Jones and others against this scheme:but I know that men run into errors from both extremes;from that of seeing too much,as well as that of seeing too little;and that the most subtle refiners are apt to miss the true point of political wisdom,which consists in distinguishing justly between what is absolutely best in speculation,and what is the best of things practicable in particular conjunctures.The scheme,no doubt,was built on a manifest absurdity,and was liable to many inconveniencies,difficulties and dangers;but still it was the utmost that could be hoped for at that moment:and the single consideration,one would think,should have been this:whether,united under such an Act of Parliament,they would not have opposed the succession of the Duke of York,with less inconveniency,less difficulty and danger,than disunited,and with the laws against them.The truth is,that as there were men at this time,desirous that the King should be on desperate terms with his Parliament,because they were so themselves;in like manner there were others,who desired,for a reason of the same nature,that the Parliament should be on desperate terms with the King.These were factious interests,and they prevailed against the national interest,which required that the King should be separated at any rate from his brother,instead of being united to him by a fear made common to both.But the die was thrown;and the leaders of the Whig party were resolved.'to let all lie in confusion,rather than hearken to any thing,besides the exclusion'.Obstinacy provoked obstinacy.
The King grew obstinate,and severe too,against his natural easiness and former clemency of temper.The Tory party grew as obstinate,and as furious on their side,according to a natural tendency in the disposition of all parties:and thus the nation was delivered over,on the death of King Charles,'àla sottise de son frère';'to the folly and madness of his brother'.