第37章 Letter X(1)

Sir,It may be asked,perhaps,how men who are friends to a government,can be enemies at the same time to the constitution upon which that government is founded.But the answer will be easy,if we consider these two things:

first,the true distinction,so often confounded in writing,and almost always in conversation,between constitution and government.By constitution we mean,whenever we speak with propriety and exactness,that assemblage of laws,institutions and customs,derived from certain fixed principles of reason,directed to certain fixed objects of public good,that compose the general system,according to which the community hath agreed to be governed.

By government we mean,whenever we speak in the same manner,that particular tenor of conduct which a chief magistrate,and inferior magistrates under his direction and influence,hold in the administration of public affairs.

We call this a good government,when the execution of the laws,the observation of the institutions and customs,in short,the whole administration of public affairs,is wisely pursued,and with a strict conformity to the principles and objects of the constitution.We call it a bad government,when it is administered on other principles,and directed to other objects either.wickedly or weakly,either by obtaining new laws,which want this conformity,or by perverting old ones which had it;and when this is done without law,or in open violation of the laws,we term it a tyrannical government.In a word,and to bring this home to our own case,constitution is the rule by which our princes ought to govern at all times;government is that by which they actually do govern at any particular time.One may remain immutable;the other may,and as human nature is constituted,must vary.One is the criterion by which we are to try the other;for surely we have a right to do so,since if we are to live in subject.ion to the government of our Kings,our Kings are to govern in subjection to the constitution;and the conformity or nonconformity of their government to it,prescribes the measure of our submission to them,according to the principles of the Revolution,and of our present settlement;in both of which,though some remote regard was had to blood,yet the preservation of the constitution manifestly determined the community to the choice then made of the persons who should govern.Another thing to be considered is this:when persons are spoken of as friends to the government,and enemies to the constitution,the term friendship is a little prostituted,in compliance with common usage.Such men are really incapable of friendship;for real friendship can never exist among those who have banished virtue and truth.

They have no affection to any but themselves;no regard to any interest except their own.Their sole attachments are such as I mentioned in the last letter,attachments to power and profit,and when they have contracted a load of infamy and guilt in the pursuit of these,an attachment to that protection,which is sufficient to procure them appearances of consideration,and real impunity.They may bear the semblance of affection to their prince,and of zeal for his government;but they who are false to the cause of their country,will not be true to any other;and the very same minister who exalts his master's throne on the ruins of the constitution,that he may govern without control,or retire without danger,would do the reverse of this,if any turn of affairs enabled him to compound,in that manner,the better for himself.

Under a prince therefore tolerably honest,or tolerably wise,such men as these will have no great sway;at least,they will not hold it long.Such a prince will know,that to unite himself to them,is to disunite himself from his people;and that he makes a stupid bar gain,if he prefers trick to policy,expedient to system,and a cabal to the nation.Reason and experience will teach him that a prince who does so,must govern weakly,ignominiously and precariously;whilst he,who engages all the hearts,and employs all the heads and hands of his people,governs with strength,with splendour,and with safety,and is sure of rising to a degree of absolute power,by maintaining liberty,which the most successful tyrant could never reach by imposing slavery.But how few men (and princes,by their leaves,are men)have been found in times past,or can be hoped for in times to come,capable of governing by such arts as these?Some cannot propose the ends,nor some employ the means;for some are wicked,and some are weak.This general division runs through the whole race of mankind,of the multitudes designed to obey,and of the few designed to govern.It was this depravity of multitudes,as well as their mutual wants,which obliged men first to enter into societies,to depart from their natural liberty,and to subject themselves to government.

It was this depravity of the few (which is often the greater,because born no better than other men,they are educated worse)which obliged men first to subject government to constitution,that they might preserve social,when they gave up natural liberty,and not be oppressed by arbitrary will.Kings may have preceded lawgivers,for aught I know,or have possibly been the first lawgivers,and government by will have been established before government by constitution.Theseus might reign at Athens,and Eurytion at Sparta,long before Solon gave laws to one,and Lycurgus to the other of these cities.