第70章 Letter XVII(2)

The property of the commons is not only become far superior to that of the lords upon the whole,but in the detail there are few,very few,instances to be produced of greater shares of private property amongst the latter,than amongst the former;and as the property of the commons is greater,so it is.equally free.There are no badges of servitude on one side;no pretence of any superiority,except those of title and rank,on the other.The peers are,in some points,I speak it with all the respect due to them,commoners with coronets on their coats of arms;and affecting to act as such,it is plain they desire very wisely to be taken for such,on many occasions.The interests on these two estates then,with regard to property,are the same;and their particular rights and privileges are now so well ascertained,and so distinguished,that as the proximity of their interests of one sort should always unite them,so the distance of those of another sort cannot easily make them clash.In short,these two orders,according to the present constitution (and how different is it from that of Rome,or,in the last respect,even from that of Spain,not to mention that of France?)have no temptation,and scarce the means,of invading each other:so that they may the better,and the more effectually,employ their vigilance,and unite their efforts,whenever it shall be necessary,against the encroachments of the crown,from whose shackles they have both emancipated themselves,whether the attempts to impose these shackles again are carried on by prerogative,or by the more formidable enemy of liberty,corruption.

It hath been observed already,that although the crown hath the sole power of creating peers,yet the independency of the peerage on the crown is secured by this:that their rights and privileges cannot be taken from them,at the will of the crown.Could the crown unmake,as well as make peers,it would be a jest to talk of three estates,since there would be virtually,and in effect,but two;and therefore our constitution hath provided against it.

But the commons of Great Britain can make,and at proper seasons,and in a proper manner,unmake their representatives;by which means,many inconveniencies and mischiefs are avoided,and many wise and just ends obtained.The peers of the realm can,the commons cannot,assemble in their collective body,without exceeding those numbers,amongst whom the quiet,order,decency and solemnity of a senate may be preserved.The peers therefore sit in Parliament in their collective,the commons in their representative body.The peers have an inherent,the commons a delegated right.The peers are therefore accountable for their conduct,as all other men are,to God,to their own consciences,to the tribunal of public fame,and to no other.But the commons are accountable to another tribunal,as well as to these,to that of their constituents;before which they must frequently appear,according to the true intent of our constitution,to have a censure,or approbation,passed on their conduct,by the refusal,or grant of new powers to the particular members.Thus the collective body of the people of Great Britain delegate,but do not give up,trust,but do not alienate their right and their power,and cannot be undone by having beggary or slavery brought upon them,unless they co-operate to their own undoing,and in one word betray themselves.

We cannot therefore subscribe to those two sayings of my Lord Bacon,which are quoted to this effect;'That England can never be undone,unless by Parliaments;and that there is nothing,which a Parliament cannot do.'--Great Britain,according to our present constitution cannot be undone by Parliaments;for there is something which a Parliament cannot do.A Parliament cannot annul the constitution;and whilst that is preserved,though our condition may be bad,it cannot be irretrievably so.The legislative is a supreme,and may be called,in one sense,an absolute,but in none an arbitrary power.

'It is limited to the public good of the society.It is a power,that hath no other end but preservation,and therefore can never have a right to destroy,enslave,or designedly to impoverish the subjects;for the obligations of the law of nature cease not in society,etc.'--If you therefore put so extravagant a case,as to suppose the two houses of Parliament concurring to make at once a formal cession of their own rights and privileges,and of those of the whole nation to the crown,and ask who hath the right,and the means,to resist the supreme legislative power?I answer,the whole nation hath the right;and a people who deserve to enjoy liberty,will find the means.An attempt of this kind would break the bargain between the king and the nation,between the representative and collective body of the people,and would dissolve the constitution.From hence it follows,that the nation which hath a right to preserve this constitution,hath a right to resist an attempt,that leaves no other means of preserving it but those of resistance.

From hence it follows,that if the constitution was actually dissolved,as it would be by such an attempt of the three estates,the people would return to their original,their natural right,the right of restoring the same constitution,or of making a new one.No power on earth could claim any right of imposing a constitution upon them;and less than any that King,those lords,and those commons,who,having been entrusted to preserve,had destroyed the former.