第39章

Thus we are led to see that there is no freedom for the intentions or actions of men; for the mind of God, foreseeing all things without error or deception, binds all together and controls their results.And when we have once allowed this, it is plain how complete is the fall of all human actions in consequence.

In vain are rewards or punishments set before good or bad, for there is no free or voluntary action of the mind to deserve them ?and what we just now determined was most fair, will prove to be most unfair of all, namely to punish the dishonest or reward the honest, since their own will does not put them in the way of 148:1 -- Horace, Staires , II.v.59.Page 149honesty or dishonesty, but the unfailing necessity of development constrains them.Wherefore neither virtues nor vices are anything, but there is rather an indiscriminate confusion of all deserts.And nothing could be more vicious than this; since the whole order of all comes from Providence, and nothing is left to human intention, it follows that our crimes, as well as our good deeds, must all be held due to the author of all good.Hence it is unreasonable to hope for or pray against aught.For what could any man hope for or pray against, if an undeviating chain links together all that we can desire? Thus will the only understanding between God and man, the right of prayer, be taken away.We suppose that at the price of our deservedly humbling ourselves before Him we may win a right to the inestimable reward of His divine grace: this is the only manner in which men can seem to deal with God, so to speak, and by virtue of prayer to join ourselves to that inaccessible light, before it is granted to us; but if we allow the inevitability of the future, and believe that we have no power, what means shall we have to join ourselves to the Lord of all, or how can we cling to Him? Wherefore, as you sang but a little while ago, 1 the human race must be cut off from its source and ever fall away.

'What cause of discord is it breaks the 149:1 -- Supra , Book IV.Met.vi.

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bonds of agreement here? What heavenly power has set such strife between two truths? Thus, though apart each brings no doubt, yet can they not be linked together.Comes there no discord between these truths? Stand they for ever sure by one another? Yes,' tis the mind, o'erwhelmed by the body's blindness, which cannot see by the light of that dimmed brightness the finest threads that bind the truth.But wherefore burns the spirit with so strong desire to learn the hidden signs of truth? Knows it the very object of its careful search? Then why seeks it to learn anew what it already knows? If it knows it not, why searches it in blindness? For who would desire aught unwitting? Or who could seek after that which is unknown?

How should he find it, or recognise its form when found, if he knows it not? And when the mind of man perceived the mind of God, did it then know the whole and parts alike? Now is the mind buried in the cloudy darkness of the body, yet has not altogether forgotten its own self, and keeps the whole though it has lost the parts.Whosoever, therefore, seeks the truth, is not wholly in ignorance, nor yet has knowledge wholly; for he knows not all, yet is not ignorant of all.He takes thought for the whole which he keeps in memory, handling again what he saw on high, so that he may add to that which he has kept, that which he has forgotten.' Page 151Then said she,' This is the old plaint concerning Providence which was so strongly urged Philosophy by Cicero when treating of Divination, 1 and you yourself have often and at length questioned the same subject.

But so far, none of you have explained it with enough diligence or certainty.

The cause of this obscurity is that the working of human reason cannot approach the directness of divine foreknowledge.If this could be understood at all, there would be no doubt left.And this especially will I try to make plain, if I can first explain your difficulties.

'Tell me why you think abortive the reasoning of those who solve the question thus; they argue that foreknowledge cannot be held to be a cause for the necessity of future results, and therefore free will is not in any way shackled by foreknowledge.2 Whence do you draw your proof of the necessity of future results if not from the fact that such things as are known beforehand cannot but come to pass? If, then (as you yourself admitted just now), foreknowledge brings no necessity to bear upon future events, how is it that the voluntary results of such events are bound to find a fixed end? Now for the sake of the argument, that you may turn your attention to what follows, let us state that there is no foreknowledge at all.Then are the events which are decided by free will, bound by any necessity, so far as this goes?

151:1 -- Cicero, De Divinatione , II.

151:2 -- Referring to Boethius's words in Prose iii.of this book, p.145.Page 152Of course not.Secondly, let us state that foreknowledge exists, but brings no necessity to bear upon events; then, I think, the same free will will be left, intact and absolute." But," you will say, " though foreknowledge is no necessity for a result in the future, yet it is a sign that it will necessarily come to pass." Thus, therefore, even if there had been no foreknowledge, it would be plain that future results were under necessity; for every sign can only shew what it is that it points out; it does not bring it to pass.

Wherefore we must first prove that nothing happens but of necessity, in order that it may be plain that foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity.