3 Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia

The security situation in Northeast Asia is one of the global hot issues. In this region where China is located, some states or regions have nuclear weapons or are under the US nuclear protection. Mongolia, a nuclear-weapon-free state, is an exception. In “the six-party talks” on North Korea's abandonment of nuclear weapons, China, the US and Russia are all nuclear states. Although the US is not a Northeast state, it has nuclear weapons in this region and provides nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea. North Korea is devoted to the pursuit of independent defense capability and keeps developing independent nuclear deterrence.

The complexity of the nuclear situation in Northeast Asia is also reflected in the fact that most states and non-state actors in this region ever showed interests in developing nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, some states or regions protected by the US once doubted the defense promise that the US had made for Northeast Asia and thus started their own underground nuclear programs. This happened in South Korea and Taiwan. But the US stopped these programs after it obtained relevant information. What is worth mentioning is that Japan was not determined to abandon its nuclear weapons in spite of the fact that it ever experienced two nuclear attacks. At the end of 1960s, Japan was hesitant in joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.Although the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato advocated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, the then Japanese government still made a memorandum among ministries, proposing that Japan should develop nuclear technologies and materials but not make nuclear weapons. In addition, Japan claimed that it would never introduce nuclear weapons from other states; actually, it signed a secret convention with the US, permitting the US ships with nuclear weapons to enter into Japanese harbors without noticing Japan in advance and to bring nuclear weapons into the base of Okinawa.

In general, Northeast Asia suffers most from the nuclear shadow. During the Cold War, the two military camps confronted each other. Although the confrontation between the two superpowers has eased off after the Cold War, the Cold War vestige still remains in Northeast Asia; the military alliances established by the US pose a serious threat to China's sovereign integrity and national unity, which makes it difficult for the two states to establish long lasting mutual trust. The US still takes advantage of its quasi-allies or allies in this region to interfere in China's internal affairs. In the 21st century, the US still adheres to the policy of selling weapons to Taiwan, and the Sino-US relations still suffer from “severe periodical challenges”.

Even China, a big power, cannot totally defend itself against the intervention from the US. Therefore, it is understandable that North Korea, a small state, believes that it is facing a more serious threat from the US and cannot ignore its own military buildup. The US and Russia agreed on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2011 and are supposed to implement the nuclear disarmament step by step as the treaty requires. However, even though the US and Russia are able to accomplish the goal of nuclear disarmament in seven years after the treaty came into effect, the remaining nuclear warheads of each state at the time will still be 1550, far more than those that China has. Therefore, talks on nuclear disarmament between the US and China is not on the agenda.

The lack of trust does not only exist between China and the US or China and Japan, but also between North Korea and its main rival — South Korea, as well as with South Korea's ally, the US. It is the lack of trust that makes North Korea determined to develop its nuclear weapons, which can be dated back to the post-Cold War era. Although the end of the Cold War brought new development opportunities for many states, North Korea felt that their security environment was worsening: the US strengthened its military alliance with South Korea and Japan, while the alliance between North Korea and the Soviet Union came to an end, and China remodeled its national strategic and developmental objectives through the reform and opening-up policy. China gradually put its emphasis on economic development, regional stability and peaceful win-win, and lost interest in the military alliances formed in the Cold War period. While the surrounding states one after another adopted new policies to improve their domestic economy, North Korea, with a closed-door policy, has been increasingly detached from the world, its economic development is falling behind, and its national security is faced with more challenges at home and abroad.

Against this backdrop, North Korea repeatedly played the nuclear card in the past 20 years, attempting to “kill many birds with one stone”. First, North Korea can acquire nuclear deterrence capacity through its nuclear weapons programs. Second, achievements in the development of nuclear weapons can help to consolidate the legitimacy of the North Korean government. Third, taking advantage of the international concerns on its nuclear issues, North Korea can periodically use “freezing nuclear development” to exchange some economic benefits with the external world. Some progress was made since North Korea took part in “the six-party talks” in 2003. Through the three nuclear tests in 2006, North Korea demonstrated its nuclear capacity to the world, gained more prestige at home, and periodically acquired some help from the international community. In the meantime, North Korea does not actually want to renounce its nuclear weapons development; on the contrary, it has stepped onto a road which is in the opposite direction of nuclear disarmament.

The development of nuclear weapons is therefore fully in the national interest of North Korea: possessing nuclear weapons, avoiding wars, and acquiring benefits. From a realist perspective, the purpose of North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons is to further its national interests — security, political and economic interests with the security interest at the top. Possessing nuclear weapons, North Korea may have more independent foreign policies and no longer need to worry about the threats from nuclear states. And thus, security guarantee provided by great powers becomes unnecessary.

History shows that the US has never seriously considered a preemptive strike on its rivals who possess nuclear force. The US has to think about the possible nuclear revenge taken by its rivals or allies of its rivals. History also shows that even though the US implemented different kinds of punishment when states like China, India and Pakistan made breakthroughs in the development of nuclear weapons, within ten years after the first nuclear test, the US would recognize them as nuclear states. When China made its first nuclear test in 1964, the US once considered, but did not dare, to carry out a strike on China. With the rapid development of the international situation, the US President Nixon landed in China to seek cooperation in 1972. This happened just 8 years after China's first nuclear test. In 1998, India and Pakistan made successive nuclear tests, on which the US imposed immediate sanctions. However, in the antiterrorism context in South Asia and Central Asia, the US began to take Pakistan as a“non-NATO ally”, which means that the US had accepted Pakistan's nuclear weapons development 6 years after Pakistan's first nuclear test. In 2008, the US signed a nuclear cooperation treaty with India, largely lifting the sanctions and not banning international nuclear cooperation for civil use in India just ten years after its first nuclear test. History does not simply repeat itself, but it can be predicted that the US government will ultimately accept the fact that North Korea has nuclear capacities and change its current policy toward North Korea sooner or later.

The reason why North Korea intends to develop its nuclear capacity is, no doubt, a realist one: to obtain comprehensive interests. And other states oppose it for the sake of their own practical interests. It is still unclear that whether the US will one day lift the sanctions imposed on North Korea as it did to China, India and Pakistan. But the basic logic behind realism tells us that it is still possible that North Korea could improve its relations with the international community as a state with nuclear capacity and the US could change its policies towards North Korea as well.