Chinese Values, China’s Image and Soft Power[1]
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
Introduction
“Chinese values” have been an issue for scholars within and outside China for centuries. Chinese philosophers such as Confucius, Lao Tzu, and Mencius debated and advocated the rules that should guide relations among family members, members of the community, and rulers and the ruled.（注:A useful Western primer on Chinese philosophers is Benjamin I. Schwartz. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge: Harvard University-Belknap Press. 1985.） Western intellectuals, philosophers, scholars have researched the origins, content, and influence of Chinese values. It is fair to say that Chinese values have had international political relevance for centuries, too. The Chinese tributary system was heavily value laden, emphasizing China as the center of world civilization, the primacy of the Chinese emperor, and ceremony and ritual.（注:Useful works on China’s tributary system include Mark Mancall. The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1963 （349）: 14-26; John K. Fairbank. China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective. Foreign Affairs. 1969 （47） No. 3: 449-463; and John Cranmer-Byng. The Chinese View of Their Place in the World: An Historical Perspective. The China Quarterly. 1973 （67）: 67-79.） Dynastic China’s trade with diverse actors in Inner Asia, China’s “periphery” （e.g. Hong Kong and Macao）, and distant realms was often conducted according to the value precepts of the tributary system. As well, China’s interactions with foreign missionaries repeatedly brought the issue of Chinese values to the fore as foreign missionaries trumpeted their own values, in the process challenging extant Chinese ones.
Still, it really was only in the 1990s that the issue of Asian values generally and Chinese values specifically came to the fore. This was a function of a myriad of factors, but largely resulted from the economic successes of the four “East Asian Tigers” （Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan）. Individuals such as then Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kwan-Yew and Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad began to trumpet the superiority of Asian values.（注:Michael Barr. Lee Kuan Yew and the “Asian Values” Debates. Asian Studies Review. 2000 （24） No. 3: 309-334.） The Asian Financial Crisis at the end of the 1990s, though, undermined such claims.（注:Mark R. Thompson. Whatever Happened to “Asian Values”? Journal of Democracy. 2001 （12） No. 4: 154-165.） Nevertheless, American unilateralism as manifest in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, US economic woes, the impressive achievements of the “China model,” and the extremely successful 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo all turned the spotlight back on Chinese values and China’s image.
Most researchers do not look at the link between Chinese values and China’s image, between Chinese values and China’s image, or between Chinese values and China’s image, and China’s soft power. This is odd given the rising attention given to Chinese public diplomacy and soft power over the past five years or so.（注:Examples include Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang. Sources and Limits of Chinese “Soft Power”. Survival. 2006 （48） No. 2: 17-36; Joel Wuthnow. The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse. Issues ＆ Studies. 2008 （44） No. 2: 1-28; James F. Paradise. China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power. Asian Survey. 2009 （49） No. 4: 647-669; Wanfa Zhang. Has Beijing Started to Bare Its Teeth? Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 615-639; and Wei Liang. China’s Soft Power in Africa: Is Economic Power Sufficient? Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 667-692.） In this paper, I discuss, conceptually, the link between Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power. I first explore the fuzzy concept of soft power. Subsequently, I delve into the topic of Chinese values, China’s image, and their link. I then ponder the connections among Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power. Thereafter, I make some observations about possible spillbacks from China’s soft power to China’s image and Chinese values. Finally, I provide some concluding remarks. Concurrently, I offer some brief policy observations.
Understanding the Concept of Soft Power
There is widespread acceptance of Joseph Nye’s definition of soft power, which stresses the realization of political outcomes through attraction or a positive image rather than military instruments, economic incentives or sanctions, or other so-called “hard” mechanisms.（注:Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Fujia Lu. Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power. Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 567.） Such notions are nothing new to Chinese thinkers who have long recognized that political influence can flow from morality, benevolence, or good governance.（注：Shen Ding. Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power. Journal of Contemporary China. 2010 （19） No. 64: 255-272.） If so, then the next obvious question is how does a country （the “sender”） “attract,” build a “positive image,” or “show benevolence.” According to Nye, a country becomes attractive or acquires a positive image through its culture, values, and foreign policies.（注:Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Fujia Lu. Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power. Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 569.）
But this “answer” only raises more questions since a culture, set of values, or foreign policies is not automatically attractive or positive. For instance, a Christian culture may feel no affinity towards an Islamic one. The appeal of a country’s culture, set of values, or foreign policies not only depends upon the characteristics of the recipient or targeted party （i.e. the“target”）, but also third party—media, special interest groups, non-governmental organizations （NGOs）, allies of the target, and international governmental organizations （IGOs）— judgments of the sender. Beyond this, the attractiveness of a sender is shaped by the attractiveness of other senders. In conceptual terms, a target may find one country more attractive not because they particularly like it, but because they find another country’s culture, values, and foreign policies less attractive. It also bears worth nothing that the local, regional, and global context shapes a sender’s attractiveness and image. Security threats, for instance, may increase the attractiveness of a sender whose emphasis on a militarized foreign policy previously alienated a target.（注:Ibid.）
While the concept of soft power remains a fuzzy one, three takeaways still follow from the preceding discussion. One is that the attractiveness and image of a sender depends partially on the target. A second is that third parties influence the attractiveness and image of a sender. A third is that the context has consequences for the attractiveness and image of a sender. All of this has relevance for senders contemplating how they can enhance their soft power. Simply put, soft power is not a product purely of the sender’s making. It should be noted, in passing, that Nye’s definition of soft power has limitations and that it also is debated if the ways Nye emphasizes for countries to acquire soft power are the best or only ones.（注:Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Fujia Lu. Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power. Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 568.）
Chinese Values and China’s Image
Due to space and time constraints and its potential to distract readers from the main purpose of this piece, this section does not endeavor to define Chinese values. It does, however, seek to highlight the complexity of the concept, to give some examples of Chinese values, and to discuss possible connections between Chinese values and China’s image. Before proceeding, it should be noted that for the aforementioned reasons as well as analytical simplicity, this section does not discuss Chinese international values embodied in foreign policy doctrines such as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Peaceful Rise, and Harmonious World. Examples of such values include non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty, multilateralism, the resolution of conflict through dialogue, and development models tailored to national conditions.（注:On some of these doctrines and the values associated with them, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and）
In thinking about Chinese values, we first must recognize that “Chinese” is a contested concept. For some, “Chinese” means “mainland Chinese.” For others, it incorporates Chinese in Taiwan and Hong Kong. For yet others, it includes Southeast Asian Chinese. There are those who conceive of “Chinese” Sujian Guo. “Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy: 1-19. In: Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard （eds.）. Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy. Lanham: Rowman ＆ Littlefield-Lexington. 2008. as including all of the above. This is not just a conundrum for Westerners. I have heard Northerners say Shanghainese are not Chinese people. I have heard Shanghainese say the people of Hong Kong, where I have many relatives, are not Chinese people. And I have heard Hong Kongese say mainlanders are not Chinese in the traditional sense. In fact, some Taiwanese and Hong Kongese view themselves as having a distinct identity from their cultural brethren on the Chinese mainland.（注:An insightful, early analysis of this issue is Lynn White and Li Cheng. China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global: 154-193. In: Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim （eds.）. China’s Quest for National Identity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993.） In short, it is not so obvious what is the “Chinese” in “Chinese values,” even to Chinese!
Even if there is agreement about what “Chinese” means, it is no simple matter to specify Chinese values. If one looks at works by business specialists, historians, and sociologists, among others, there is no shortage of values that are deemed Chinese values. These include “collectivism” （i.e. a preference for the group over the individual）, respect for parents and elders, guanxi, face, respect for hierarchy, moralism （i.e. the propensity to make judgments）, opposition to injustice, ritualism, and traditionalism.（注:R. I. Westwood, S. F. Tang, and P. S. Kirkbridge. Chinese Conflict Behavior: Cultural Antecedents and Behavioral Consequences. Organizational Development Journal. 1992 （10） No. 2: 13-19; Weining C. Chang, Wing Keung Wong. Chinese Values in Singapore: Tradition and Modern. Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 2003 （6） No. 1: 5-29; and Guy Olivier Faure and Tony Fang. Changing Chinese Values: Keeping Up with Paradoxes. International Business Review. 2008 （17） No. 2: 194-207.） However, if one studies materials relating to the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, the websites and brochures of Chinese national and provincial tourist authorities, advertisements on television, in the print media, and elsewhere, and trade and investment fair promotional materials, it would appear that Chinese values include environmentalism, cosmopolitanism, consumerism, modernism,and grandiosity （i.e. an affinity for things grand）.（注：Yan Bing Zhang and Jake Harwood. Modernization and Tradition in an Age of Globalization: Chinese Television Commercials. Journal of Communication. 2004 （54） No. 1: 156-172; Faure and Fang. Changing Chinese Values. and Astrid Nordin. How Soft Is “Soft Power”? Unstable Dichotomies at Expo 2010. Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 591-613.） It is worth noting that some of these values appear to contradict others. For example, the value of respect for authority is often at odds with the values of moralism and opposition to injustice. Similarly, the values of ritualism and traditionalism can readily clash with the values of cosmopolitanism and modernism.
A country’s image can be a metaphor, such as “big brother,” “leader,” “savior,” “friend,” or “student.” It can be a series of adjectives like powerful/ weak, rising/falling, good/bad, traditional/modern, or developed/underdeveloped. Certainly, multiple images of a country can coexist and, on occasion, these images can contradict one another.（注:For a discussion of this in regards to China’s participation in the Copenhagen environmental summit, see Catherine Jones. Understanding Multiple and Competing Roles: China’s Roles in International Order. Pacific Focus （2013 forthcoming）. To be clear, Jones focuses on roles rather than images, but the two are related.） Among other images, China has been described, over the past five decades or so, as a “leader of the developing world,” a “rising power,” “a strategic partner,” a “status quo player”. Generally speaking, a country’s images are a function of diverse variables including a country’s economic and military assets, its treatment of its citizens, its behavior towards those targets that are assessing its image, its internal and external political, economic, social, environmental, and foreign policy problems and successes, its culture, and, not surprisingly, its values.（注:During his presentation for this panel, Professor Colin Mackerras also pointed to the importance of objective factors in shaping a country’s image.）
Values can affect a country’s image since the beholder of those values— i.e. the target state—may find those values disagreeable. For instance, in recent years, many South American countries such as Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela have objected to Western, largely American, capitalist values and thus have held, in varying degrees, negative images of the United States （US）. Furthermore, values are part of the features that others link with a country when they develop an image of it. For instance, Confucian values such as filial piety and respect for authority are often tied to the images that foreigners hold of China. Values also provide a benchmark for judging a country’s image.
However, while relevant, values do not always affect a country’s image or all of its images. For instance, the Chinese value of collectivism does not affect whether or not China is seen as powerful/weak nor does the Chinese value of face influence the image of China as a leader of the developing world. As well, it is critical to recognize that values can have both positive and negative effects on a country’s image. To illustrate, “respect for parents and elders” can make those who appreciate tradition/authority see China as more likable. Concurrently, it can make China seem backward or disrespectful of children to younger audiences or child rights advocates. Yet again, we see the importance of considering the target in our analyses.
A sender’s image shapes the appeal of its values, too. Positive images can attract others to a country’s values that they might not otherwise find appealing. In China’s case, China’s image as an economic success story and rising regional and global power makes its hierarchical political values alluring to a number of actors in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America that are seeking to speed up their respective countries’ economic development. Likewise, negative images can serve to depreciate the appeal of otherwise attractive values. For example, the air pollution that afflicted Beijing this winter and the discovery of more than ten thousand dead pigs in the Huangpu River in Shanghai blackened China’s image, especially in regard to environmental protection and food safety, and because of their close link to governance and regulation, diminished the appeal of China’s hierarchical political values.
A central conceptual point of this section is that Chinese values affect China’s image and vice-versa, though the connection is not automatic or obvious. The actual link is shaped by, inter alia, the nature of the target or beholder and its needs, the context, and events. Additionally, this section made the important point that it is not easy to specify the concept of Chinese values. Although not discussed here, third party interpretation not only affects the way that values and images interact, but also the way values are perceived and images constructed.
Chinese Values, China’s Image, and China’s Soft Power
It is reasonable to expect Chinese values and China’s image to affect its soft power since, by definition, soft power relates to its culture, values, and foreign policies. The precise effect, though, is far from clear. We cannot assume a priori that particular Chinese values and images of China will help China’s soft power. Conversely, we cannot assume a priori that particular Chinese values or images of China will undermine China’s soft power. This section addresses the conceptual link between Chinese values, China’s image, and its soft power.
One reason for a potential disconnect between Chinese values, China’s image and China’s soft power is that “attractiveness is in the eye of the beholder.” On the one hand, elderly audiences and Asian audiences may find Chinese values such as collectivism, filial piety, and ritualism quite appealing. On the other hand, young audiences and Western audiences may have the opposite reaction. On the one hand, Western developed countries may be turned off by China’s hierarchical political values. On the other hand, developing countries, many which confront political and social instability, may find such values alluring. Thus, the claim by some that China’s lack of democratic values is hurting its soft power needs more nuanced analysis.（注:Sheng Ding. Is Human Rights the Achilles’ Heel of Chinese Soft Power? A New Perspective on Its Appeal. Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 641-665.） Western developed countries may be turned off by China’s image as an economic, industrial, or trading powerhouse （which make China seem like a competitive threat） whereas developing or unstable countries, which see China as a potential source of aid and investment and as an alternative to Western countries and Western international financial institutions, may not.
Another possible reason for the existence of a disconnect may be because some “Chinese” values do not seem to be exclusively Chinese. For example, the importance of family or respect for elders can be found in many cultures including Hispanic ones. Likewise, the value of “collectivism” exists in Japan and Russia while the value of face is very important in Japan, South Korea, and other Asian societies.（注:Fritz Gaenslen. Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. World Politics. 1986 （39） No. 1: 78-103.） The point is not that this lack of uniqueness hurts China’s soft power, but that Chinese values may not give China any added soft power since they may not clearly distinguish China. This said, an overlap between Chinese values and the values held by targets may result in targets viewing China’s image in a more positive light.
Another factor intervening between Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power is events. To elaborate, Chinese values may be very alluring when viewed in the context of a successful mega-event such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics or a major new scientific achievement such as the launching of an astronaut into space. They may look much less appealing if they are associated with a major corruption scandal or political instability. Of course, as before, third party interpretation is germane. If international media, NGOs, and/or IGOs, for whatever reason, comment negatively on Chinese values or China’s image, then the positive spillover of those values or image on China’s soft power may be trivial or even absent.
To conclude this section, it should be mentioned that even if Chinese values and China’s image give China soft power, it does not follow that they will give China the ability to influence political outcomes. First, even if a target finds China attractive, it may not be affected in a positive political way. Many Western Europeans, for example, like Chinese food, Chinese acrobatics, and Chinese kung fu, but this has no relevance for how they think about China-related policies pertaining to trade, the environment, or North Korea. Second, even if relevant parties are affected in a positive political way, they have to mobilize to influence politics, which depends upon a wide variety of factors such as numbers, proximity, and leadership. Third, they have to have greater political power than groups who oppose changes in China-related policies. It is entirely conceivable, therefore, that any effort to reshape or market Chinese values and China’s image to influence China’s soft power may be fruitless politically even though such initiatives boost China’s soft power.（注:Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Fujia Lu. Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power. Asian Perspective. 2012 （36） No. 4: 577-578.）
China’s Soft Power and the Spillback to China’s Image and Chinese Values
There are some potentially interesting and problematic spillback effects that may ensue from China’s realization of soft power. This “fallout” needs to be considered by any Chinese policymaker focusing on enhancing China’s soft power since it produces costs that may offset the benefits derived from the soft power. First, the Chinese government may find itself obligated to take ongoing and meaningful steps to maintain the image that won it soft power. For instance, if China’s soft power derives from its image as an economic powerhouse, a country sensitive to environmental concerns, or a country that is a champion or savior of the developing world, then China will need to undertake meaningful political, economic, and other measures to ensure it remains an economic powerhouse, to protect the environment, and to serve as a friend to the developing world.
Second, maintaining soft power based on Chinese values, may require the Chinese government to find ways to validate, solidify, or downplay particular Chinese values. For example, if China’s soft power is linked in some fashion to values such as filial piety, traditionalism, or fighting injustice, then China is going to need to find ways to ensure traditional parent-child relations and respect for the elderly, to promote and preserve traditions, and to combat injustice. Complicating matters, government backing for some values—e.g. traditionalism and ritualism—may undermine government support for other values like cosmopolitanism and modernism or require it to reject/minimize such values.
In the final analysis, then, we have a paradox: soft power both liberates and constrains. It liberates by giving the sender another source of power beyond traditional sources such as military or economic power. However, it also constrains by requiring the sender to adopt measures to give meaning to the values and images serving as the fount of that soft power.
Conclusion
In my paper, I have identified a myriad of issues relating to the study of Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power.（注:The other papers presented for this panel also help us to think in a richer way about each of these concepts as well as their link.） Among other things, I have discussed the difficulties of conceptualizing “Chinese values,” reviewed the ways in which Chinese values and China’s image are linked, and pondered the interconnections between Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power. It is the nature of the complexity of the topic of soft power that my analysis raises many additional uncertainties and questions. Clearly, there is a need for analysts to undertake further research on the links among Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power.
This paper has a number of policy ramifications for the Chinese government. First, in trying to build up its soft power, Beijing needs to be aware of the complexity of links among Chinese values, China’s image, and China’s soft power. Second, when attempting to maximize the attractiveness of Chinese values, China’s image and thus China’s soft power, Beijing must always keep in mind the target of its soft power exercise, the context, competition from other values and images, third party interpretation, and the tools it uses to promote soft power.（注:Naren Chitty. Hard Elements of Soft Power. China Daily. 2010-11-19. http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/opinion/2010-11/19/content_11574979.htm.） Third, Beijing needs to be aware that the maintenance of soft power may have potential spillback effects in terms of the support its gives to specific Chinese values or images of China.
The notion of soft power is not new, but theoretical and empirical studies on it have proliferated only recently. China’s attention to soft power and theoretical-informed and comparative research on China and its soft power are an even newer phenomenon. This is a desirable trend. As shown by the creation of Confucius Institutes, welcoming of a greater number of foreign students, support for mega events, funding for public diplomacy research institutes, and intense efforts to develop its global media reach, the Chinese government is investing substantial financial and other resources to support its soft power.（注:See, e.g. More Expat Students to Study in China. China Daily. 2010-8-31. http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/china/2010-08/31/content_11228666.htm; Matthew Garrahan and Kathrin Hille. China to Expand English Language Service. Financial Times. 2011-11-7; and Chen Jia. Making a World of Difference. China Daily. 2011-12-14. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-12/14/ content_14261831.htm.） It behooves both Chinese and non-Chinese to harden their knowledge about China and its soft power.
About the Author: Jean-Marc F. Blanchard is Professor and Assistant Dean for International Cooperation and Exchange with the School of Interna-tional and Public Affairs （SIPA） at Shanghai Jiaotong University （SJTU）, Ex-ecutive Director of the SJTU SIPA Center for the Study of Multinational Corpo-rations, and Associate Director of the San Francisco State University, Center for U.S.-China Policy Studies. He is a1so a member of the Editorial Board for the Journal of Chinese Po1itical Science, a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and previously served as President of the Association of Chinese Political Studies. His research interests include Chinese outward foreign direct investment, inward foreign direct investment into China, Chinese foreign economic po1icy, Chinese foreign energy policy, multinational corporations, the po1itical economy of national securty （incentives and sanctions）, and globaliza-tion. He is a co-author of The Po1itics of Economic Sanctions and Incentives （London: Routledge, forthcoming 2013）, a co-editor of and contributor to Gover-nance, Domestic Change and Social Po1icy in China: 100 Years After the Xinhai Revo1ution （Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2013）, “China and Soft Power” （Asian Perspective special issue, Oct.-December 2012）, New Thinking about The Taiwan Issue: Theoretical Insights into Its Origins, Dynamics, and Prospects （Routledge, 2012）, Multidimensional Dip1omacy of Contemporary China （Row-man＆ Littlefield, 2010）, Harmonions World and China’s New Foreign Po1icy （Rowman＆ Littlefield, 2008）, and Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Securihty （Frank Cass, 2000）, and the author of nearly three dozen book chapters and refereed journal articles in publications such as Geopolitics, Foreign Po1icy Analysis, Security Studies, Asia Po1itics ＆ Policy, China Quarterly, China Journal of International Politics, and the Jour-nal of Contemporary China. Dr. Blanchard received his Ph.D. in Political Sci-ence from the University of Pennsylvania and A.B. in Economics from the Uni-versity of California, Berkeley. Prior to his career in academia, Dr. B1anchard worked for the U.S. government Federal Savings ＆ Loan Insurance Corporation and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and for the investment banking firm Kelling, Northcross ＆ Nobriga.
注释
[1]This is a substantially revised version of a presentation given for the panel on China’s Road: Values and National Image at the World Forum on China Studies, Shanghai, China, March 24, 2013. I would like to thank the discussant for his useful comments.